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ABSTRACT  
   
 
 
In today's era a lot of the construction projects suffer from time delay, cost 
overrun and quality defect. Incentive provisions are found to be a contracting strategy to 
address this potential problem. During last decade incentive mechanisms have gained 
importance, and they are starting to become adopted in the construction projects. Most of 
the previous research done in this area was purely qualitative, with a few quantitative 
studies. This study aims to quantify the performance of incentives in construction by 
collecting the data from more than 30 projects in United States through a questionnaire 
survey. First, literature review addresses the previous research work related to incentive 
types, incentives in construction industry, incentives in other industry and benefits of 
incentives. Second, the collected data is analyzed with statistical methods to test the 
significance of observed changes between two data sets i.e. incentive projects and non-
incentive projects. Finally, the analysis results provide evidence for the significant impact 
of having incentives; reduced the cost and schedule growth in construction projects in 
United States. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
      Construction is a major industry throughout the world accounting for a sizeable 
portion of most countries Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (David Crosthwaite, 1999).  
According to a recent report published in 2014 by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
construction industry accounts for about 3.7 percent of the United States Nation’s GDP, 
with 6.38 million workers working in this industry by the end of August, 2015 (BLS, 
2015).  
      Many construction projects suffer performance problems due to time delay, cost 
overrun and quality defect (Sun and Meng, 2009). A large number of research efforts 
have been made to identify various possible solutions to address these types of 
performance problems. Jaafari (1996) states that incentive provisions can be used as a 
contractual strategy; which has a significant potential to address performance problems in 
construction projects. 
      The correct use of incentives can motivate substantial change in the industry. For 
example:  In energy industry; tax incentives are drivers for usage of renewable energy 
growth in the United States. In industries motivating employees is always one of the 
management’s biggest concerns. Most of them use rewards and recognition programs to 
help them achieve their goals and objectives (Severt and Breiter, 2010). Organizations 
that develop cultures based on employee recognition and rewards programs will be better 
positioned to survive and even thrive, because their employees remain motivated and 
engaged (Severt and Breiter, 2010). Rose and Manley (2011) saw the use of incentives as 
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a key means of improving performance by simulating the motivation to work harder and 
smarter in pursuit of high-order performance objectives.  
      The basic principle of incentive in construction contracting is to take advantage of a 
contractor’s general objective to maximize his profits by giving him the opportunity to 
make more profits if he performs the contract efficiently (Bower et al., 2002). According 
to Bubshait (2003), clients can provide time incentives for early completion, cost 
incentive for cost saving, quality incentives for zero or minor defects, and sometimes 
safety incentives for complying with safety rules and standards. This research analyzes 
the impact of incentives currently being used in construction, specifically on how they 
impact cost and schedule performance in construction projects in United States. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
      Many studies have been carried out in different parts of the world to understand the 
various aspects of incentives; these are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Incentives: 
      The literal definition of incentive states that incentive is “a payment or concession to 
stimulate greater output or investment” (Oxford Dictionary, n.d). Stukhart (1984) says 
that incentives are used in construction contracting to reduce overall contract cost, to 
control time and to increase support of specific performance goals such as productivity, 
quality, safety, technological process, innovation and management. Similarly, in terms of 
the construction industry this definition is translated into, attempts to increase production 
or performance in return for increased psychological or material rewards (Liska and 
Snell, 1992). From a client perceptive, it is ideal that a project is completed in the 
minimum time, at the minimum cost, and with the best quality (Arditi et al. 1997). 
      In addition to incentives, disincentives are often seen in practice, for example: time 
disincentive for late completion of project (Shr and Chen, 2004), cost disincentive for 
cost overrun and quality disincentive can be set for major defects (Meng and Gallagher, 
2011). Therefore, an incentive refers to a reward and a disincentive refers to penalty 
(Bubshait, 2003). The purpose of an incentive/disincentive scheme is to motivate the 
contractor for excellent performance or demotivate the contractor for poor performance 
(Meng and Gallagher, 2011). However, this study focuses on incentives performance 
only.  
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Incentives in Construction:  
     As stated earlier, there are generally four types of incentives in construction projects, 
e.g. time, cost, quality, (Stukhart, 1984) and safety incentives (Ibbs and Ashley, 1987). In 
recent years, an incentive mechanism in construction industry has gained an important 
attention from researchers and practitioners. For example,  
 Jaraiedi et al. (1995) developed a set of guidelines for the use of incentives in 
highway construction contracts.  
 Bubshait (2003) compared the perceptions of clients and contractors regarding the 
use of incentives.  
 Rose and Manley (2010) provided practical recommendations for clients who 
design and implement financial incentives in their projects.  
 Meng and Gallagher (2011) analyzed the relationship between use of incentives 
and performance of projects in UK and ROI.  
 Hasan and Jha (2015) listed out various attributes affecting the successful use of 
incentive / disincentive clauses in reaching the performance goals. 
Cost and Time Incentives: 
      Cost incentive is provided for the construction project; if the owner has cost saving in 
the project. Cost saving is often split between the client and the contractor in terms of a 
sharing ratio (Al-Harbi, 1998; Broome and Perry, 2002). Similarly, time incentive is 
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provided for the construction project; if the project is completed within estimated 
schedule. Time incentive is generally paid to the contractor in the form of a bonus, e.g. a 
certain amount for each day of early completion (Arditi et al., 1997). 
      By comparison, cost and time incentives have received much more research attention 
than other incentives such as quality and safety incentive. For example, Ibbs and Ashley 
(1987) emphasized that schedule in a construction project is definitely improved by the 
inclusion of positive incentive provisions. Hijleh and Ibbs (1989) studied the different 
types of schedule incentives in construction projects. Jariedi et al. (1995) concluded that 
incentive/disincentive provisions enable project completion time to be reduced by up to 
50%. Jaafari (1996) analyzed time and cost incentives in marine construction projects. On 
the other hand, Shr and Chen (2004) analyzed how to set maximum time incentives for 
highway construction projects, whilst Chan et al. (2010) evaluated how to achieve better 
performance through target cost contract in an underground railway station modification 
project.   
Other Incentives: (Quality and Safety) 
     Quality incentives are provided if contractor performs the job without any defects. 
Similarly, safety incentives are provided in the construction projects for complying with 
safety rules and standards. Both safety and quality incentives are paid as a bonus in 
construction projects. 
     As mentioned earlier, research efforts for safety and quality incentives are quite 
limited. Ibbs and Ashley (1987) emphasized safety is definitely improved by the 
inclusion of positive incentive provisions in construction projects. Construction Industry 
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Institute (CII) (1993) identified “written safety incentive program” as one among the five 
high-impact safety techniques for construction, which are known as zero-injury 
techniques. Similarly, Gellar (1999) emphasized that having incentive schemes reduced 
the accidents and injuries in the construction site. According to Teo et al. (2005) site 
safety is affected by four main factors: company safety policy, construction process, 
personnel management with regard to safety, and incentives. Molenaar et al. (2009) states 
that safety incentives increase the safety performance in construction project and have a 
greater effect on safety motivation than do disincentives. Similarly, with respect to 
quality incentives, Meng and Gallaghar (2011) provided an empirical evidence for how 
quality incentives have improved projects’ performance in construction projects in UK 
and ROI.  
      To ensure the success of incentive mechanisms the contractor needs to make an extra 
effort for the enhancement of project management processes, the creation of collaborative 
working environments, and the motivation of his staff and workforce (Meng and 
Gallagher, 2011). Similar to the construction industry, incentives are also adopted and 
they have been successful in other industry to achieve better performance; this is 
explained in following paragraphs. 
Incentives in Other Industries: 
      Compared to the construction industry, very limited amount of research is available in 
other industry which is more a type of qualitative study. For example, Besley and Ghatak 
(2003) studied the incentives in public bureaucracies and private non-profits emphasizing 
the role of matching principals’ and motivational agents’ mission preferences in 
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increasing organizational efficiency, Jeffrey (2003) emphasized a strong causal 
relationship between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and 
firm risk. Similarly, Belghitar and Clark (2014) assessed the impact of compensation 
based incentives, together with monitoring mechanisms on investment related agency 
costs.  
      In recent times, incentives were more successful in energy industry and gained more 
attention from public and private industry. Ozcan (2014) says countries apply different 
incentive systems in order to encourage the use of renewable energy source for 
electricity. Similarly, Black et.al (2014) stated that many states in United States have 
implemented legislation in the form of financial incentives and renewable portfolio 
standards to support wind development. It is shown that state tax incentives and physical 
drivers have a significant positive impact on wind energy growth. One of the supportive 
tax credit incentive schemes applicable for renewable energy generations adopted in 
United States is Production Tax Credit (PTC), which provides a tax credit for the 
production of electricity from renewable sources and the sale of that electricity to an 
unrelated party (KPMG, 2013). Furthermore, benefits of having incentives are discussed 
in the following paragraphs.  
 
Benefits of Incentives: 
      “Incentivization is “a process by which a provider is motivated to achieve extra 
‘value-added’ services over those specified originally and which are of material benefit to 
the user. These should be assessable against predefined criteria. The process should 
benefit both parties. It creates a more proactive cooperative relationship between the 
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contracting parties and reinforces the cultural shift away from the traditional, adversarial 
approach to contracting.” (HM, 1991) (Bower et al., 2002) Some benefits that can be 
delivered by Incentivization in addition to those inherent in the base contract include 
(HM, 1991; Bower et al, 2002): 
 Lower cost  
 Faster or more timely delivery of service with no compromise of quality 
 Full understanding of the relationship cost, the quality of the service delivery, and 
the ability to deal more effectively with changes during the contract 
 Increased service level 
 Greater price stability 
 Enhanced achievement of the desired outcome 
 Improved management of information 
 Improved management, control, and monitoring of contract. 
Furthermore, the construction industry Institute (CII) reported similar benefits, which 
include the following (CII 1995; Bower et al., 2002): 
 Lower cost facilities 
 Improved schedule performance 
 Improved customer satisfaction 
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 Improved alignment and focus on client’s objective, and 
 Pay for performance 
      Stukhart (1984) concluded that owners must emphasize negotiation of the most 
reliable targets rather than elaborate sharing schemes and complex incentives, and it is 
essential that targets must be realistic estimates of actual costs, labor hours or schedules. 
If contractor wants to successfully obtain the incentive offered, they need to anticipate 
problem areas and fix them before occurrence, and incentives should be made measurable 
and objective using relevant benchmarks (Bower et al., 2002). Contractors should ensure 
that the level of quality and safety are not affected due to the fast tracking of a project 
with every effort to maintain standards (Bubshait, 2003).  
      Although previous studies present the good understanding of incentive mechanisms to 
a project’s success, most of these studies have not provided any empirical data for the 
performance outcomes of incentives project. Therefore, there exists a gap in knowledge 
to evaluate the actual impact of incentives on project performance parameters.  This 
research objective makes an attempt to quantify the impact of incentives on cost and 
schedule growth performance in the construction projects. This objective is achieved by 
analyzing the real data collected from more than 30 construction projects in United States 
through a questionnaire survey. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
      The present study was carried out to quantify the performance of incentive based 
construction projects by comparing with the non- incentive construction projects in 
United States. The main objectives of this research study are: 1) Quantifying the impact 
of incentives on cost growth and 2) Quantifying the impact of incentives on schedule 
growth.   
      This study requires quantitative methodology to evaluate the changes observed 
between incentive and non-incentive projects. The research method begins with a 
summary of literature review on incentives study that was reviewed in context for both 
the construction industry and other industries. Based on the identification of strengths and 
weaknesses within previous studies, the review helped identify a gap for this research. 
After completing the literature review, a survey questionnaire was developed. After the 
iterative revision from the industry experts, the questionnaire was advertised nationally. 
The survey was sent to the construction firms that have incentives in their projects and 
also to the firms that did not provide incentives to set a baseline for comparison. Finally, 
a quantitative analysis was done on the collected data to investigate the impacts of 
incentives on cost and schedule performance. Figure 1 show the research methodology 
used in this study. 
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Figure 1: Flow Chat of Research Methodology 
Literature Review: 
      The literature review shows the qualitative responses among researchers and 
practitioners regarding the importance of incentives construction projects and other 
industry. Although, most of the earlier research contributes a good understanding of 
impact of incentive mechanism, there are obvious limitations with in these studies. For 
example, most of the previous studies, such as Bower et al. (2002), Bubshait (2003), 
Rose and Manley (2011), and Black et al.(2014) have performed only a qualitative 
analysis and not a quantitative study of performance. Therefore, it is hard to quantify the 
real effect of incentives on project performance. Although, Meng and Gallagher (2011) 
provided some empirical results on incentives, concluding construction projects with 
incentives have better performance in UK and ROI. There exists a research gap to 
evaluate the impact of incentives on construction project performance parameters in 
United States. The following paragraphs explain the survey development and data 
collection process adopted in this study. 
 
 
Literature 
Review 
Survey 
Development
Data 
Collection 
Data Analysis 
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Survey Development: 
      Identifying the key incentive variables and performance metrics provides guidance 
about the type of data that needs to be collected. Therefore, the completion of the 
literature review serves as a foundation for the survey development. The survey was 
developed based on the identified incentive variables and purposely designed to gather 
incentive input data and quantitative project performance metrics. Before the survey was 
administered, it was reviewed by industry and academic experts as well as survey experts 
and was pilot tested on a limited number of projects to maximize its effectiveness. The 
survey included a question that categorizes projects into incentive and non-incentive 
based projects; a question that identifies the performance metrics on which incentives are 
based (e.g., cost, schedule); a question to gauge the value of the incentives and their 
distribution among project stakeholders and questions to assess the cost performance 
(e.g., initial cost versus final costs) and schedule performance (estimated date versus final 
date) of the project.  
Data Collection: 
      The resulting survey allowed for a data collection effort targeting incentives 
characteristics and performance metrics for individual construction projects. The data 
collection was aimed at institutional projects completed in the last decade, and 
representing all major project delivery systems. The survey targeted projects that have 
incentives, as well as projects that do not. The data of non-incentive projects acts as a 
baseline for this study. This data collection effort resulted in more than 30 construction 
projects, of which two-thirds are non-incentive based, and one third are incentive based.  
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Data Analysis: 
     For the purpose of analysis of the data collected from the questionnaire survey three 
statistical methods have been chosen in these research studies which are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
Box –and -Whisker Plots: 
     The box plot is an exploratory graphic, created by John W. Tukey, used to show the 
distribution of a data set. It is a nonparametric graphical summary of data, displaying the 
sample minimum, lower quartile, median, upper quartile, and maximum. A thick black 
line, dividing the dataset in half, represents the median value. The rectangle represents 
the 50% of the data around the median, whereas the remaining 50% of the data are 
divided equally above and below the rectangle (El Asmar et al., 2013). If the data set 
includes one or more outliers, they are plotted separately as points on the chart.  Box 
plots provide a useful way to visualize the range and other characteristics of responses for 
a large group.  In this research study box plots are used to analyze the distribution of data, 
and to identify outliers. The outliers are the data points which are above or below 
1.5times the inter-quartile range values in box-plot (Lehmann and Romano, 2005).   
Quantile –Quantile (Q-Q) Plots: 
     The quantile –quantile (q-q) plots are the probability plot, which is graphical method 
for comparing two probability distributions by plotting their quintiles against each other 
(Wilk, 1968). In general, the basic idea is to compute the theoretically expected value for 
each data point based on the distribution in question. If the data indeed follow the 
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assumed distribution, then the points on the q-q plot will fall approximately on a straight 
line (David, n.d) 
     A q-q plot is a plot of the quantiles of the first data set against the quantiles of the 
second data set. By a quantile, it means the fraction (or percent) of points below the given 
value. That is, the 0.3 (or 30%) quantile is the point at which 30% percent of the data fall 
below and 70% fall above that value. A 45-degree reference line is also plotted. If the two 
sets come from a population with the same distribution, the points should fall 
approximately along this reference line. The greater the departure from this reference 
line, the greater the evidence for the conclusion that the two data sets have come from 
populations with different distributions (Lehmann and Romano, 2005). In this study Q-Q 
plots are used to test the normality of the two data sets i.e. incentives projects and non-
incentives projects.   
Mann –Whitney -Wilcoxon Test: 
      The Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test is the alternative test to the independent 
sample t-test. It is a non- parametric test that is used to compare differences between two 
independent groups when the dependent variable is either ordinal or continuous, but not 
normally distributed. It is also used to test whether two population means are equal or 
not. MWW test assumes the sample drawn from the population is random.  The specific 
formula given below is used to calculate U-value in MWW test (Lehmann and Romano, 
2005). 
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𝑈 = 𝑛1𝑛2 +
𝑛2(𝑛2 + 1)
2
− ∑ 𝑅𝑖
𝑛2
𝑖=𝑛1+1
 
      Similar to parametric tests, alpha value of 0.05 is used to test the significance. A p-
value smaller than 0.05 indicates the differences observed between the two samples are 
significant. In this study, MWW test is used to test the significance of changes observed, 
for the assumed observations for non-linear distribution data which is concluded from q-q 
plots. The following section presents and discusses the results of the analysis, starting 
with the characteristics of the construction projects studied for this paper. 
 
 
 
  16 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Data Characteristics:  
      Through the collaboration with contractors, cost and schedule data was collected from 
the 35 construction projects, which are all predominantly located in the U.S. Midwest and 
Pacific Southwest regions. Of these 35 data sets, 24 data sets are from non –incentive 
projects which are used as a baseline for comparison with 11 incentive based projects to 
identify the impact of incentive on project performance in terms of cost and schedule.  
      On the collected data sets, the quantitative analysis is performed between incentives 
and non-incentives projects in a comparative way, from which it is clear to see the 
influence of having incentives had improved the cost and schedule performance in 
construction projects in United States. The statistical analysis provides a quantitative 
evidence for the significance of changes observed in cost and schedule growth data 
between incentive and non-incentive projects. The overall data analysis is done in the 
following three steps; as shown in Figure 2. The analysis of difference between incentive 
and non-incentive projects in terms of cost and schedule performance is addressed in the 
following sections. 
 
Figure 2: Steps of Data Analysis 
Analysis of Data Distribution
Check for Normal Distribution 
Test for Significance of Changes
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A) Impact of incentives on cost growth:  
      In the survey questionnaire, the respondents are asked to provide the information 
about initial cost and final cost of the project from which the cost growth percentage is 
calculated for the corresponding project. The mathematical formula used to calculate the 
cost percentage is shown below: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ % =
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
× 100 
   
      The calculated values from the collected data are used in this study for performing 
analysis with statistical methods.  
 
Analysis of Data Distribution: 
      First, in this study box plot is used to analyze the data distribution and identify the 
outliers in the data. A boxplot can give information regarding variability, mean and 
median of statistical data set. 
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Figure 3: Data Distribution of Cost Growth%  
      Figure 3 shows the boxplot of incentive and non- incentive projects over cost growth 
percentage data. From the box plot it is observed that non-incentive projects have higher 
distribution than incentive projects, the median value is found to be near to each other. 
Similarly, the mean value of non-incentives projects is greater than the incentives 
projects. And also substantially more variance is observed in non –incentive projects’ 
which ranges from -6% to 22% whereas incentives projects’ ranges from -4% to 8%.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics between incentive and non- incentive projects 
with respect to cost growth data. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Cost Growth % 
Statistic Non - 
incentive 
Incentive 
Number of observations 24 11 
Minimum -19.573 -13.538 
Maximum 37.719 14.802 
Range 57.292 28.340 
1st Quartile 0.526 -2.795 
Median 5.024 2.609 
3rd Quartile 10.217 3.355 
Mean 6.571 0.977 
Variance (n) 125.467 47.469 
Variance (n-1) 130.922 52.216 
Standard deviation (n) 11.201 6.890 
Standard deviation (n-1) 11.442 7.226 
 
      Continuing, the variance in non-incentive projects is more than double the value of 
incentive projects. From all these observations it is clearly seen that the data set of 
incentive projects and non –incentive projects are independent to each other, difference 
between means is relevant and  incentive projects  have less cost growth compared to that 
of non- incentives projects. From the analysis it is also observed that most of the projects 
with incentives have completed within the estimated cost. Though there are some projects 
that exceeded budget, but this value is comparatively less when compared to that of non-
incentive projects.  
       Overall, two outliers are observed in each of incentive and non-incentive projects 
data set. These outlier values are greater than 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. For better 
accuracy of results, these outliers are removed in further study during the test for 
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significance of changes, because an outlier may indicate an experimental error; which 
may commonly affect the results and assumptions (Grubbs, 1969).  
Check for Normal Distribution: 
      From the above distribution analysis, clear changes are observed between the data 
sets due to the presence of incentives. Now, it is important in this study to understand 
whether the data is normally distributed or non –normally disturbed, because most of 
statistical tests rest up on the assumption of normality which have a tendency to change 
final results.  For this purpose q-q plots are used in this research work to study the visual 
distribution of the data sets, which are presented in Figure 4 & 5. 
 
Figure 4: Q-Q Plot / Cost Growth % of Non –Incentive projects 
      Figure 4 shown above present the q-q plot of non- incentive projects with cost growth 
percentage data values. From this figure, it is clearly observed that most of the data set 
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values don’t fall near to the 45th quartile line; which means the cost growth data of non - 
incentive projects are non-normally distributed. 
 
Figure 5: Q-Q plot/ Cost Growth% of Incentive projects 
      Similar to the observations made in Figure 4, in Figure 5 the Q-Q plot presents the 
cost growth percentage values of incentive projects. From this figure, it is observed that 
most of the data set values don’t fall near to the 45th quartile line; which means the cost 
growth data of incentive projects are non- normally distributed. 
 
Test for Significance of Observed Changes: 
     As the two dataset values are non-normally distributed, in this study non-parametric 
test i.e. Mann- Whitney Wilcoxon (MWW) test is used to test for the significance of 
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changes observed in Figure 3. The MWW-test is used to compare differences between 
two independent groups when the dependent variable is either ordinal or continuous but 
not normally distributed. Usually, the test is conducted at a confidence level (α) value of 
5% (Zar, 1984). Initially the test is conducted without removing the outliers from the data 
set.  
      From MWW-test, it is observed that “p” value i.e. 0.065 (6.5%) is greater than the 
“α” value i.e. 0.05 (5%) which means that probability of null- hypothesis to be true is 
only 6.5%. This means that changes observed between median values of incentive and 
non –incentive projects in Figure 3 are not significant. 
      Similarly, as mentioned earlier in order to observe the accurate results, two extreme 
outliers are removed from the two data sets of incentives and non- incentives projects, 
and MWW-test is conducted again on the data set; assuming that outliers have an impact 
on the above results. After retesting, it is observed that “p” value i.e. 0.047 (4.7%) is less 
than the α-value i.e. 0.05 (5%) which mean that probability of null- hypothesis to be true 
is only 4.7%. In other words the probability of disproving the null –hypothesis is 95.3%, 
which means the observed changes in Figure 3 between the median values of incentives 
and non- incentives project are significant. Therefore, based on the collected sample data 
the author can’t reject the hypothesis i.e. having incentives in the project had decreased 
the construction cost growth in United States. 
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B) Impact of Incentives on Schedule growth:  
      In the survey questionnaire, the respondents are asked to provide the information 
about estimated final date and actual final date of the project schedule; from which the 
number of work days for the project is determined, and schedule growth percentage is 
calculated. The mathematical formula used to calculate the cost percentage is shown 
below: 
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ % =
 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 
× 100 
     The calculated values from the collected data are used in this study for performing 
analysis with statistical methods to identify the performance of incentives on schedule 
growth of the construction project.   
 
Analysis of Data Distribution: 
     Similar to the cost growth data, box plots are used to analyze the data distribution and 
to identify the outliers in the data. Initially, all 35 projects are used for the distribution 
analysis. Figure 6 shows the data distribution of incentive and non-incentive projects over 
schedule growth percentage.  From Figure 6, on incentives distributions it is clearly 
observed that the mean value is out of inter quartile range or box plot. This is because one 
of the incentive based project is having a schedule growth of 329.3%. From enquiry, it is 
known that the project is halted for several months in order to get permissions from the 
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local government agencies which resulted in high percentage of schedule growth. For the 
feasibility of analysis, this project is excluded from incentive project data set. 
. 
 
Figure 6: Data Distribution of Schedule Growth% with Extreme Outlier 
      Figure 7 shows the box plot of incentive and non- incentive projects over schedule 
growth percentage data. A Total of 34 projects are used for this analysis; of which 24 are 
non –incentive based and 10 projects are incentive based.  
     The mean values of incentives and non-incentives data set are different from each 
other i.e. the mean value of incentive projects is close to zero whereas the mean value of 
non-incentive projects is found to be at 3.7%. The median value of schedule growth in 
non- incentive projects is found to be approximately lying on the first quartile value that 
is very close to zero which means that 50 % of the construction projects in this data set 
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are facing schedule growth problem; where as in case of incentives the median value is 
negative and it is observed to have 70% of construction projects are completed on time or 
prior to the schedule. And also substantially more variance is observed in non –incentive 
projects’ which ranges from -11% to 21% whereas incentives projects’ ranges from -21% 
to 9%. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics between incentives and non- incentives 
projects with respect to schedule growth data. 
 
Figure 7: Data Distribution of Schedule Growth % 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Schedule Growth % 
Statistic  Non-
Incentives 
 Incentives 
Number of observations 24 10 
Minimum -23.232 -21.317 
Maximum 21.725 45.055 
Range 44.957 66.372 
1st Quartile -0.139 -7.712 
Median 0.055 -3.594 
3rd Quartile 13.344 1.838 
Mean 3.788 -0.988 
Variance (n) 125.456 315.527 
Variance (n-1) 130.911 350.585 
Standard deviation (n) 11.201 17.763 
Standard deviation (n-1) 11.442 18.724 
 
      From all these observations it is clearly seen that the data set of incentive projects and 
non –incentive projects are independent to each other. Difference between the mean 
values shows that incentive projects have less schedule growth compared to that of non- 
incentives projects. From the analysis it is also observed that most of the projects with 
incentives have completed within the estimated schedule. Though there are some projects 
that exceeded schedule, but this value is comparatively less when compared to that of 
non-incentive projects.  
        Overall, two outliers are observed in each of incentive and non-incentive projects 
data set. For better accuracy of results, these outliers are removed in further study during 
the test for significance of changes observed in figure 7. 
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Check for Normal Distribution: 
      From the above distribution analysis, clear changes are observed between the data 
sets due to the presence of incentives. In this study, q-q plots are plotted for both 
incentives and non-incentive projects data sets to observe the normality in distribution, 
which are presented in Figure 8 & 9. 
 
Figure 8: Q-Q Plot/ Schedule Growth % of Non-Incentive Project 
      Figure 8 shows the Q-Q plot of non- incentive projects with schedule growth 
percentage values. From this figure, it is clearly observed most of the data set values are 
not lying on the 45th quartile line; which means the schedule growth data of non - 
incentive projects are non-normally distributed. 
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Figure 9: Q-Q Plot / Schedule Growth% of Incentive Projects 
      Similarly, Figure 9 shows the q-q plot of incentive projects with schedule growth 
percentage values. From this figure, it is observed that, all the data set values don’t fall on 
the 45th quartile line; which means the schedule growth data of incentive projects are non 
- normally distributed. 
Test for Significance of Observed Changes: 
      As both the data set are non-normally distributed, in this study Mann- Whitney 
Wilcoxon (MWW) test is used to test the significance of changes observed between the 
mean values in Figure 7. Usually, the test is conducted at a confidence level (α) value of 
5% (Zar, 1984). Initially the test is conducted without removing the outliers from the data 
set.  
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      From MWW-test, it is  observed that “p” value i.e. 0.082 (8.2%) is greater than the 
“α”value i.e. 0.05 (5%) which means that probability of null- hypothesis to be true is 
8.2% which means  the changes observed between the data sets are not significant. 
      Similarly, as stated earlier in order to observe the accurate results, two extreme 
outliers are removed from the two data sets i.e. one each from incentives and non- 
incentives projects, and MWW test is conducted again on the data set, assuming that 
outliers have affected the above results.  
      From retesting, it is observed that p-value i.e. 0.013 (1.3%) is less than α- value i.e. 
0.05 (5%) which means that probability of accepting null- hypothesis is only 1.3%. In 
other words the probability of disproving the null –hypothesis is 98.7%, which means the 
observed changes in Figure 7; between the median values of incentive and non- incentive 
projects are significant. Therefore, based on the collected sample data the author can’t 
reject the hypothesis i.e. having incentives in the project had decreased the construction 
schedule growth in United States. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
      This study analyzes the cost and schedule performance of construction projects in 
presence of incentives. Based on the quantitative data obtained from a questionnaire 
survey, the author can’t disprove the hypothesis i.e. having an incentive improves the cost 
and schedule performance of construction projects in United States. On the whole, this 
paper shows that incentives play role in completing the project on time and within the 
planned budget. The main finding of this paper include 1) having incentives decreased 
the cost growth in construction projects in United States, 2) having incentives decreased 
the schedule growth in construction projects in United States.  From the analysis it is 
observed that most of the projects with incentives have completed within the estimated 
schedule and cost. Though there are some projects that exceeded budget and schedule, 
but this value is comparatively less when compared to that of non-incentive projects. 
These findings are similar to Meng and Gallahar (2011) work in UK and ROI, in which 
they provided empirical evidence that shows having quality and time incentives improved 
the performance in construction projects.  
      One limitation of this study is the size of the dataset.  Further research in this area can 
be conducted by collecting the more quantitative data on incentives projects, and 
categorizing the projects in to specific type of incentives. Based on the type of incentives; 
performance metrics of project is evaluated, and also, developing a probabilistic model 
that determines the performance metrics based on the incentive value will reduce the 
decision making time in construction projects. Similarly, quantifying the performance of 
disincentives and qualitative study of its impact on business relationships in construction 
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projects will be one of the interesting topics to work on. In addition, further investigation 
is recommended in this area for deeper understanding of incentives on project 
performance objectives. 
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